What was iraqi freedom

July 10, - Gen. July 16, - The surge officially ends, and troop levels are reduced. December 4, - The Iraqi Presidential Council approves a security agreement that paves the way for the United States to withdraw completely from Iraq by June 30, - US troops pull back from Iraqi cities and towns and Iraqi troops take over the responsibility for security operations. However, US troops remain in the country to continue combat operations and patrols in rural areas.

August 19, - The last US combat brigade leaves Iraq. A total of 52, US troops remain in the country. May 22, - The last British military forces in Iraq, 81 Royal Navy sailors patrolling in the Persian Gulf, withdraw from the country. A total of British troops died during the country's eight-year mission in Iraq. October 17, - A senior US military official tells CNN that the United States and Iraq have been unable to come to an agreement regarding legal immunity for US troops who would remain in Iraq after the end of the year, effectively ending discussion of maintaining an American force presence after the end of October 21, - Obama announces that virtually all US troops will come home from Iraq by the end of the year.

According to a US official, about of the 39, troops currently in Iraq will remain to assist in arms sales. The Center of Military History established the following seven completed campaign phases for Operation Iraqi Freedom:. This was followed by the U. He was captured in December and executed in by the Iraqi government for crimes against his own citizens.

Two units of the Arkansas National Guard were present during the initial invasion. The th Medical Company, Ground Ambulance from Charleston Franklin County provided combat medical evacuation support, while the rd Truck Company from Blytheville Mississippi County provided logistical support in delivery of supplies for invading forces.

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq experienced major outbreaks of violence throughout the country. Much of this was sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Additionally, the United States had not planned well for the follow-up operations after the war ended. The most difficult challenge for U.

It was one of the first two National Guard brigades called to duty, along with another from North Carolina, and the first National Guard light infantry brigade deployed. After a year-long deployment of active combat, the brigade returned to Arkansas in April ; it had thirty-three soldiers killed, fifteen of whom were Arkansas National Guard members.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was unique in that it was the first time Americans at home had the opportunity to witness war in real time. National and local news media were embedded from the beginning of the invasion with troops as they entered Iraq, reporting daily on events and activities. On the homefront, the Arkansas brigade was featured almost daily in articles in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.

An embedded journalist from the newspaper, Amy Schlesing, and a host of rotating photographers joined the Arkansas forces in — and again in They lived day-to-day life alongside the troops, sharing all the dangers and hardships. The articles and photographs allowed Arkansans to witness the war from the perspective of their own sons, daughters, husbands, and wives. The first deployment was also highlighted in a Discovery Times Channel documentary film titled Off to War.

The ten-part series detailed daily activities, combat, and life in a war zone with two companies of Arkansas soldiers. In June , governance of Iraq returned to Iraqi control with plans to conduct the first-ever democratic elections. On January 30, , parliamentary elections were held in order to begin the process of writing a new constitution.

However, with the election of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister, sectarian tensions increased, and the Sunni minority became increasingly alienated by the new government. Bush desired to increase troop levels in an attempt to bring stability and peace. The troop withdrawal policy does not imply that no further deployments of U.

Some U. In addition, some units may end up serving shorter tours in Iraq than the now-standard 12 months of "boots on the ground. Some officials have suggested that the headquarters consolidation is likely to take place after the Iraqi national elections, but well before the August transition. The new entity is expected to be significantly smaller in terms of personnel.

The consolidation would reflect not only an elimination of redundancy, but also, as one official described it, discretely "choosing not to do some things. The Obama Administration's drawdown and transition policy was widely considered to reflect a compromise between two broad schools of thought—advocates, respectively, of a relatively gradual or a relatively accelerated drawdown. Many observers have suggested that the policy splits the difference by maintaining a relatively robust force on the ground through the political hurdles of , which preparing to draw U.

One school of thought, which included many military commanders, supported a relatively longer timetable. In December , U. Proponents of a gradual approach also argued that it is important to take every remaining opportunity to train, advise, and mentor the Iraqi security forces ISF. Some military commanders were also reportedly concerned that any significant drawdown would be complicated and would require substantial time and attention from U.

They urged delaying the bulk of the drawdown until , to allow MNF-I to focus primarily on its substantive mission in The other broad school of thought urged the adoption of a relatively accelerated timeline. Some advocates of an accelerated timeline sought simply to end the U. Other proponents of this school argued that the U. Announced troop withdrawal plans, it was argued, could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to accelerate their own efforts to assume more responsibility and make progress toward reconciliation, and by urging international partners to increase their constructive involvement.

Some accelerated timeline advocates underscored the strain that simultaneous war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed on U. Military Departments, responsible in accordance with Title 10, U. Code, for "organizing, manning, training and equipping" the force, and some key observers, have expressed concerns about the stress these demands have placed, and may continue to place, on the force.

Some observers from each school of thought have expressed concerns about the Obama Administration policy. At the time of the policy announcement, some Democratic Party leaders in Congress, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, questioned the need for a residual force as large as 50, troops.

The Obama Administration announced its Iraq transition policy, and the U. Most observers agree that the GoI faces several major tests in These began with the provincial elections held in most parts of the country on January 31, , and are also scheduled to include district-level elections in June; a national referendum on the security agreement in July; and national-level elections at the end of the year.

These events carry some risk of unrest, but, many observers contend, should these hurdles be cleared safely and successfully, they might serve to further catalyze the consolidation of the Iraqi state. In addition, the GoI still faces several persistent strategic challenges — potential "spoilers" — that could disrupt not only security conditions on the ground but also progress toward a unified and stable Iraq.

One major challenge, increasingly prominent in , is a portfolio of tensions and competing claims in "the north," particularly between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. The set of related issues includes resolving the political status of the multi-ethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, together with other "disputed territories" along the Green Line that divides the Kurdistan Regional Government KRG from the rest of Iraq. Further, the KRG and GoI continue to dispute the proper dispensation of oil revenues generated by the areas rich oil reserves.

While Kirkuk city itself has been relatively calm, coalition and Iraqi officials in Kirkuk have noted with concern that outside players with strong vested interests, including ethnically based Iraqi political parties, and Turkey-based supporters of Iraqi Turkmen, sometimes use inflammatory language to stir up tensions in the city.

UNAMI is expected to present a comprehensive set of recommendations for resolving tensions in the north, as a basis for discussion. Provincial elections, held elsewhere on January 31, , remain to be scheduled for At Ta'amin province, which includes Kirkuk. A second major challenge concerns how effectively Sunni Arabs, are incorporated socially, economically, and politically into the Iraqi polity.

Sunni Arabs, who are concentrated in western and central Iraq, were a disproportionately privileged minority under Saddam's rule but lost much of that status after regime change. The provincial elections held on January 31, , marked a positive step, by increasing Sunni Arab political representation at the provincial level. A particular concern is the ongoing integration of members of the Sons of Iraq SoI "community watch" program.

On October 1, , the GoI began assuming responsibility for the SoIs, including paying their salaries, and this transition was expected to be completed by April The integration of former SoIs into the Iraqi security forces and civilian jobs has proceeded very slowly, and participants have reported serious delays in the payment of salaries.

Some practitioners and observers have expressed concerns about the possible security repercussions if the GoI were to shut down the program, cease paying salaries, or fail to secure alternative employment for the SoIs.

A third major challenge is the potential for violence in "the south," home to a long-standing and growing competition for power and resources between well-established Shiite political factions backed by militias that have sometimes used violence, and also to tribal Shi'a who may be beginning to find a public voice.

Against that volatile backdrop in southern Iraq, both U. By the start of , several major but uneven transitions were underway at the operational level in Iraq. First, the substantial security improvements achieved over the course of the "surge" had further deepened, with some fluctuations during combat operations in in specific parts of Iraq, and some remaining insurgent activity, particularly in north central Iraq.

Second, accordingly, the focus of U. According to U. The August operations in Diyala, targeting affiliates of Al Qaeda in Iraq AQI , were planned by the Iraqis in advance but still required coalition forces to provide enablers and to help hold areas once they were cleared. A fourth transition was a growth in in formal Government of Iraq GoI security responsibility, antedating the Security Agreement, as additional provinces transitioned to "provincial Iraqi control" PIC.

In practice, PIC arrangements varied from province to province but as a rule gave the GoI lead security responsibility—and practice exercising that responsibility—and mandated increased coordination of coalition operations and activities with the GoI.

In terms of substance, many embedded "transition teams" shifted their training focus away from basic "move, shoot, and communicate" skills, toward more advanced skills including staff functions and the use of enablers. In terms of organization, the use of various forms of unit-to-unit partnering, which allows advising by example as well as by instruction, and complements the work of transition teams, grew substantially.

Sixth, by early , MNF-I was a far less "multi-national" force than in the past. By the end of , most remaining coalition partner countries had brought their deployments in Iraq to a close. Faced with the expiration of the UN mandate authorizing the multi-national force in Iraq, several coalition partners—the United Kingdom, Australia, and Romania—each signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GoI, providing a new legal basis for the presence of their troops, but each of their mandates is set to expire on July 31, Seventh, the geographical focus of U.

Eighth and finally, as civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTs grew, they increasingly took the lead in some efforts formerly spearheaded by the U. Nevertheless, the military's extensive presence on the ground at district and local levels, compared with the limited number of U.

Meanwhile, U. In , as Iraqi civilian and military capacity and capabilities grew, and as Iraqi confidence in those capabilities increased, GoI officials demonstrated growing assertiveness and less inclination to consult with U. Most practitioners and observers expect that U. President Obama's drawdown and transition policy charts a new strategic course but also raises several questions about the future U. At the same time, OIF experiences as a whole raise additional strategic questions about U.

Government preparations to undertake future complex contingencies. Announcing the drawdown and transition policy, President Obama stated that the goal is "an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant.

Under that broad rubric, as the U. Such broad objectives might address the following elements:. As the Iraqi appetite for accepting guidance and advice from international partners continues to wane, U. One challenge is an apparent mismatch in Iraq between those who are most susceptible to leverage and those making key decisions. Iraqi warfighting commanders, as a rule, recognize the extent to which they rely on U. At the same time, Iraqi political leaders—those who make the decisions—tend toward overconfidence in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, and a less urgent sense of the need for close mil-to-mil partnership with the United States.

Another strategic consideration concerns the kind of long-term partnership the United States wants to have with Iraq, including the traditional panoply of diplomatic and economic as well as security ties, and the kind of U. On January 27, , Secretary Gates told the Senate and House Armed Services Committees that "…we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come.

In the security field, decisions about the shape of that future partnership could suggest different possible forms for a future U.

In theory, one option would be establishing permanent U. Kurdish leaders have reportedly long proposed a permanent U.

However, the "permanent basing" option does not appear to enjoy support from the Obama Administration, Members of Congress, or from the Government of Iraq as a whole.

A presence of U. Another option would be a particularly robust U. Office of Security Cooperation OSC , responsible for some combination of training, advising, and mentoring Iraqi security forces, and helping build the capacity of Iraqi security ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC would be responsible to both the U. Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commanding General of U.

Central Command. One possible model might be the U. It is not clear to what extent U. In the context of growing potential for low-level U. How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, and equip the force — how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities required—may depend in part on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable those lessons are deemed to be to potential future engagements.

For example, lessons might be drawn from OIF concerning how to most effectively train foreign security forces and to prepare U. President Obama's drawdown and transition policy for Iraq has pressed the Army, in particular, to address the question of how and whether to institutionalize key capabilities developed, often through trial and error, for use during OIF.

According to DOD officials, AABs are to be built on the chassis of existing BCTs and augmented as necessary with capabilities appropriate for the new stability operations mission in Iraq. The near-term requirement to prepare and deploy such units does not resolve a more fundamental question — how permanent should AABs be?

In theory, for potential future contingencies, the Army could simply plan to use and adapt its standard force structure to meet new requirements as they arise, or it could dedicate resources to establish a standing capacity of some kind.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has underscored that "…building the security capacity of other nations through training and equipping programs has emerged as a core and enduring military requirement," 54 suggesting the need to institutionalize such capabilities. John Nagl has proposed one possible institutional solution — creating a permanent, standing Advisory Corps of 20, combat advisors, which would be organized, equipped, educated and trained to develop host nation security forces.

Meanwhile, some officials suggest that Army leaders remain reluctant to make permanent changes to the Army's force structure, not least because such changes could mean assuming increased risk in more traditional areas of warfighting.

BESOs, Army officials stressed, would not depart radically from the familiar BCT construct—they would "remain full-spectrum capable," and would be "…a matter of augmentation … slight modifications to gain skill sets.

For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used to help frame future discussions about the Department's force planning construct—a shorthand description of the major contingencies the Department must be prepared to execute simultaneously—which is used to shape the total force. Drawing conclusions, however, is not simple. Analytical challenges include deciding what kind of contingency OIF represents, how likely it is to be representative of future contingencies, and which chronological "slice" of OIF requirements given the great variation in troop commitment and equipment over time to use to represent the effort.

A further strategic consideration concerns how lessons are drawn from OIF regarding U. One set of questions prompted by OIF experiences concerns the decision-making process about whether to go to war and if so, how to do so.

Key issues include the rigor of the inter-agency debates, the effectiveness of the provision of "best military advice" to key decision-makers, and the thoroughness of congressional oversight in general. Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns balancing roles, responsibilities, resources, and authorities among U. Government civilian agencies, including deployable capabilities, should be enhanced; and that the modalities for coordinating and integrating civilian and military efforts in the field should be improved.

The President's drawdown and transition announcement left open a number of operational issues that U. The Obama Administration transition policy generally calls for a diminishing U. During the formal occupation of Iraq, from to , the coalition was responsible for all facets of Iraqi public life. In the early post-occupation days, the coalition's general approach was to do everything possible to get Iraqi institutions up and running, limited primarily by resources and personnel available to implement the efforts.

As Iraqi capacity grew, the role of Iraqi civilian and military officials and institutions shifted, to various degrees, from sharing responsibilities to leading, with some support or back-up from the coalition. By , U.

The debates addressed both the U. A number of U. One former brigade commander in Iraq, from this school of thought, argued, "It's time to let go," and added the observation: "The coalition has a very difficult time having the restraint and discipline to refrain from intervening.

Some officials countered that, given the shrinking U. President Obama's drawdown and transition policy prescribes the withdrawal of all U. Further, in March , the Obama Administration announced plans to withdraw a total of 12, U. Counterinsurgency COIN theory emphasizes the importance of conducting operations "by, with and through" host nation forces; and helping to build such forces when their capacity or capabilities are not adequate.

From the outset, the organization and focus of the coalition's efforts to train, equip, and mentor the ISF varied across the battlespace of Iraq, depending on the conditions on the ground, the level of development of the locally based ISF, and the availability of coalition forces for training missions.

A key operational consideration, looking ahead, is how to accomplish the ISF training mission as U. The "standard" approach to training the ISF has been the use of embedded "transition teams" that typically live and work with a host nation unit. One key point of variation over time has been the size of these teams.

Transition teams working with the Iraqi Army, for example, typically included between 11 and 15 members, depending on the size of the Iraqi unit they embedded with.

Marines, consistently used larger teams, with between 30 and 40 members. In , as the basic operational capabilities of the ISF grew, the use of embedded transition teams shifted toward higher-level ISF headquarters, including brigades and divisions. The substantive efforts of the teams also shifted, from basic skills like patrolling to leadership and enablers. For example, teams working with the Iraqi Army increased their focus on staff functions and logistics, and teams working with the Iraqi Police increased the emphasis on specialized skills like forensics.

In effect, transition teams work themselves out of a job, as their host nation partner unit improves. The U. While logistics experts in the U. Military Police MPs generally do not have the requisite specialized policing skills and have thus relied on collaboration with civilian International Police Advisors, who have been in short supply.

In addition to transition teams, coalition forces throughout Iraq have made substantial use of various forms of "unit partnering," in which coalition maneuver units work side-by-side with Iraqi units of equal or larger size.

Commanders on the ground have stressed the value of unit partnership, as a complement to the use of embedded teams, as an effective way to "show" rather than just "tell" ISF unit leaders how they might most effectively organize their headquarters, lead their troops, and manage staff functions. Coalition forces have also provided substantial support to the "capacity-building" of the key security institutions of the Government of Iraq—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau.

Coalition officials have stressed the growing importance of maximizing such capacity-building efforts while Iraqis are still receptive to receiving such training. With appropriate leadership skills, they argued, Iraqi senior leaders in the security sector could make substantially greater and more effective contributions to the development of the ISF, gradually reducing the need for U. Coalition commanders have also underscored the importance of utilizing the right U.

The Obama transition policy for Iraq underscores the importance of the ISF training and advisory effort, naming it one of the three missions of the U. The increasingly smaller U. One issue may be the ability of the U. On the other hand, over time, ISF units are expected to rely increasingly on their own capabilities for such support.

A related issue may be the ability of AABs to continue the practice of providing mentorship through close relationships with equivalent Iraqi units. One option, under the AAB footprint, might be a transition from a relationship of "partnership" to one of "liaison" with less senior U.

By early , many U. Top U. This phrase refers to establishing a security presence in cities and towns, including small command outposts of U.

That presence, commanders have noted, allowed ongoing collaboration between U. In , before the terms of the U. Looking ahead, one option is that some U. The Agreement required the establishment of a committee structure to elaborate more detailed implementing instructions; by February , such a structure of committees and sub-committees, including Iraqi and U.

In a December letter to the force, regarding the new Agreement, GEN Odierno noted that the new environment would "require a subtle shift in how we plan, coordinate, and execute missions throughout Iraq," and that new rules of engagement would be issued. In practice, according to commanders on the ground, before the Security Agreement went into effect, the vast majority of U.

Further, most of those operations were already "combined" with Iraqi forces. These transitions had been facilitated by the Provincial Iraqi Control PIC process, in which, by decision of the GoI in consultation with MNF-I, lead security responsibility for a given province was transferred to Iraqi control, based on assessments of security conditions and local ISF capabilities. Another common practice, before the Security Agreement, was that the GoI granted approval in advance for U.

The use of warrant-based arrests—now required—was already frequently practiced in As of early , U. One U. BCT commander, based in Qadisiyah province where the 8 th Iraqi Army Division is headquartered, stated: "We do all of our operations … by, with and through the Iraqi security forces. They're all joint. Anybody that we detain, we detain with a warrant. Concerning the use of Iraqi air space, the Security Agreement stated: "Surveillance and control over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement".

It added a caveat: "Iraq may request from the United States forces temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.

In addition, that training has focused, first of all, on skills relevant to the ongoing counter-insurgency COIN fight, such as moving troops and supplies, and providing some ISR. In late , U. The Security Agreement did not address a parallel concern related to operational coordination: Iraqi coordination with U. Article 22 of the Security Agreement described provisions for detainee operations.

One set of provisions placed tight constraints on the circumstances under which U. The Security Agreement mandated that U.

In anticipation of a more stringent new detention regime, throughout , MNF-I carried out a detainee release program, releasing detainees to their homes and communities whenever possible. As of late November , U. In many cases, for the detainees it held, the coalition lacked releasable evidence with legal sufficiency in Iraqi courts. Scrupulous collection of evidence—such as photographs, diagrams, eye-witness accounts—common in civilian law enforcement, was not always an integral part of coalition combat operations in Iraq.

Such legacy detainees could pose real security threats to the Iraqi population, or to the coalition, commanders warned. Some coalition officials and outside observers also expressed concerns that the GoI adjudication of legacy detainee cases, whether or not legally sufficient evidence exists, might evince a sectarian bias—in particular, a tendency to treat Shiite Arabs more leniently than Sunni Arabs. In January , Iraqi and U. At the first such transfer, Iraqi officials had warrants for 42 of the 1,; they chose to keep about 70 others for further investigation; and they planned to release the remaining persons to their home communities at a rate of about 50 per day.

Some detainees have expressed fears that they may face harm if they return to their home communities, as part of the new release process; in those cases, the GoI reportedly agreed to help them resettle elsewhere. Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the balance of U.

While on this day, we remember this international conflict, we should also take time to shift our focus away from mere historical facts and instead focus upon the many servicemen and women who served in the United States military during this time.

To the approximately 4, reported causalities and the 32, service members wounded in action, we thank you for your service. To the living Veterans and to those who have lost their lives since returning home, we thank and honor you for your service.

To the health care professionals, engineers, support personnel and volunteers who also helped and served during Operation Iraqi Freedom, we thank you for your service. And, to the families and loved ones of those who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we thank you for your support. To everyone who served during Operation Iraqi Freedom, we appreciate your service and dedication today.

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